Research

How Much Legislative Effectiveness Do Voters Sacrifice for Party?

With Bea C. Burack, Lanie Everett, and Mei Xu

Elections & Democratic RepresentationWorking PaperEnglishStudent project: Dartmouth
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Abstract

Electoral accountability depends in part on whether voters reward candidates' governing competence even when doing so requires crossing party lines. We study this tradeoff using a candidate conjoint experiment fielded with 1,840 U.S. respondents during the 2022 midterm campaign. The experiment randomized congressional candidates' party, ability to advance substantive legislation, ethical standards, constituent alignment, and demographic attributes. Profile-level estimates show that legislative effectiveness increases vote choice, but that this reward is smaller in different-party contests. Choice-level estimates reveal the tradeoff directly. In same-party contests, respondents choose the more effective candidate 57% to 64% of the time. In different-party contests, they choose a more effective out-party candidate over a less effective copartisan only 30% to 36% of the time. Party loyalty can therefore override governing competence.

Abstract source: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4444692

Citation

Burack, Beatrice, Lanie Everett, Mei Xu, and Yusaku Horiuchi. n.d. “How Much Legislative Effectiveness Do Voters Sacrifice for Party?.” Working paper. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4444692

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