Abstract
A central explanation for domestic audience costs---the decrease in approval leaders face when backing down from a previous threat---is that domestic audiences seek to avoid the international repercussions of failing to honor their country's commitments. But how do international audiences actually react to foreign leaders' actions during crises? We develop a theory of allied audience costs, specifying how and why foreign publics within allied states respond when leaders make threats they fail to carry out. First, we argue that allied audiences, like their domestic counterparts, impose "inconsistency costs" on leaders who say one thing and do another. Second, because many allied citizens prefer to deter common adversaries, they reward leaders who issue threats that signal aggressive behavior. This "belligerence benefit" contrasts with domestic audience cost theories that emphasize penalties for belligerence. Third, the magnitude of this benefit depends on individual beliefs, such as concerns of entrapment and abandonment. Evidence from a survey experiment in Japan supports these expectations. These findings show that allied audiences evaluate leaders using logics that differ from those operating within domestic publics, creating distinct incentives during military crises.
Citation
Xu, Weifang, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Kelly Matush. n.d. “Security Dependence and Public Opinion in Crises: Inconsistency Costs and Belligerence Benefits.” Working paper. https://ssrn.com/abstract=6414559